Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study
AbstractWe study auctions with resale based on Hafalir and Krishna's (2008)  model. As predicted, weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that average auction prices tend to increase. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. In other treatments outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral Nash model's predictions. Bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale than without, in line with the theory.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 146 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Auctions Resale Experiment;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Plum, M, 1992. "Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 393-418.
- Hafalir, Isa & Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 589-602, September.
- Haile, Philip A., 2000. "Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 231-248, November.
- Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January.
- Isa Hafalir & Vijay Krishna, 2008. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 87-112, March.
- repec:att:wimass:9702 is not listed on IDEAS
- Rod Garratt & Thomas Tröger, 2006.
"Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale,"
Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 753-769, 05.
- Garratt, Rod & Tröger, Thomas, 2005. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 42, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Rod Garrat & Thomas Tröger, 2005. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2004. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Microeconomics 0405005, EconWPA.
- Guth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2005.
"Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1891-1913, October.
- Güth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2001. "Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,15, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Philip A. Haile, 2001.
"Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 399-427, June.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2004. "Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 281-294, 01.
- Andreas Lange & John A. List & Michael K. Price, 2010.
"Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain: Evidence from the Lab and Field,"
NBER Working Papers
16360, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lange, Andreas & List, John A. & Price, Michael K., 2011. "Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: Evidence from the lab and field," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 54-64, January.
- Saral, Krista Jabs, 2012.
"Speculation and demand reduction in English clock auctions with resale,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 416-431.
- Saral, Krista Jabs, 2010. "Speculation and Demand Reduction in English Clock Auctions with Resale," MPRA Paper 25139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista Jabs, 2013.
"Multi-Object Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Analysis,"
43665, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marco Pagnozzi & Krista Jabs Saral, 2013. "Multi-Object Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Analysis," CSEF Working Papers 328, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.