This paper is concerned with the study of durability as an aspect of competition and market structure that contributes to determining the incentives for mergers. We find that relative to the incentives in industries that produce non-durable goods the durability of the good produced by an industry enhances the incentive for mergers in the presence of intertemporal consistency problems. Further, the analysis indicates that in durable good markets a good antitrust policy should combine a restriction to rent solely with a prudent merger policy.
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Volume (Year): 68 (2008) Issue (Month): 3-4 (December) Pages: 691-701 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Amagoia Sagasta & Ana I. Saracho, 2004.
"Mergers in Durable Goods Industries,"
DFAEII Working Papers
200403, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, revised 24 Nov 2008.
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