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Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?

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  • Petrella, Giovanni
  • Resti, Andrea

Abstract

Supervisory stress tests assess the impact of an adverse macroeconomic scenario on the profitability and capitalisation of a large number of banks. The results of such stress test exercises have recently been disclosed to the public in an attempt to restore confidence and to curb bank opaqueness by helping investors distinguish between sound and fragile institutions. In an unprecedented effort for transparency, the 2011 European Union stress test lead to the release of some 3400 data points for each of the 90 participating banks. This makes it an ideal setting to investigate a number of hypotheses on the information role of the stress tests.

Suggested Citation

  • Petrella, Giovanni & Resti, Andrea, 2013. "Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5406-5420.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:12:p:5406-5420
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stress tests; Financial crises; Bank opaqueness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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