IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v36y2012i5p1520-1527.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Bliss, Mark A.
  • Gul, Ferdinand A.

Abstract

This paper investigates the association between Malaysian politically connected (PCON) firms and the cost of debt. We extend previous research that finds Malaysian PCON firms are perceived as being of higher risk by the market, and by audit firms, by providing evidence that lenders also perceive these firms as being of higher risk. We also find that PCON firms have a significantly (1) higher extent of leverage, (2) higher likelihood of reporting a loss, (3) higher likelihood of having negative equity, and (4) higher likelihood of being audited by a big audit firm. We suggest that PCON firms are charged higher interest rates by lenders as a result of efficient contracting given their higher inherent risks. Additionally, we find that CEO duality present in PCON firms is perceived by lenders as being more risky, and that a higher proportion of independent directors on the audit committee mitigate this perceived risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Bliss, Mark A. & Gul, Ferdinand A., 2012. "Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1520-1527.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:36:y:2012:i:5:p:1520-1527
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.12.011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426611003566
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.12.011?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pittman, Jeffrey A. & Fortin, Steve, 2004. "Auditor choice and the cost of debt capital for newly public firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 113-136, February.
    2. Kim, Kong-Hee & Al-Shammari, Hussam A. & Kim, Bongjin & Lee, Seung-Hyun, 2009. "CEO duality leadership and corporate diversification behavior," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(11), pages 1173-1180, November.
    3. Lee, Janet, 2009. "Executive performance-based remuneration, performance change and board structures," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 138-162, June.
    4. Ferdinand A. Gul, 2006. "Auditors' Response to Political Connections and Cronyism in Malaysia," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 931-963, December.
    5. Qiu, Jiaping & Yu, Fan, 2009. "The market for corporate control and the cost of debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 505-524, September.
    6. Bassett, Michael & Koh, Ping-Sheng & Tutticci, Irene, 2007. "The association between employee stock option disclosures and corporate governance: Evidence from an enhanced disclosure regime," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 303-322.
    7. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-862, August.
    8. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    9. Fraser, Donald R. & Zhang, Hao & Derashid, Chek, 2006. "Capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1291-1308, April.
    10. Goyal, Vidhan K. & Park, Chul W., 2002. "Board leadership structure and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-66, January.
    11. Johnson, Simon & Mitton, Todd, 2003. "Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-382, February.
    12. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    13. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
    14. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    15. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tee, Chwee Ming, 2018. "Political connections and the cost of debt: Re-examining the evidence from Malaysia," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 51-62.
    2. Bliss, Mark A. & Gul, Ferdinand A. & Majid, Abdul, 2011. "Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO Duality? Some evidence from Malaysian audit pricing," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 82-98.
    3. Bliss, Mark A. & Goodwin, John A. & Gul, Ferdinand A. & Wong, Anson, 2018. "The association between cost of debt and Hong Kong politically connected firms," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 321-334.
    4. Bliss, Mark A. & Gul, Ferdinand A., 2012. "Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2344-2350.
    5. Joni, Joni & Ahmed, Kamran & Hamilton, Jane, 2020. "Politically connected boards, family and business group affiliations, and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3).
    6. Tee, Chwee Ming & Pak, Mei Sen & Lee, Mei Yee & Majid, Abdul, 2021. "CEO generational differences, risk taking and political connections: Evidence from Malaysian firms," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C).
    7. Sinan Abdullah Harjan & Min Teng & Sayyed Sadaqat Hussain Shah & Jamal Hadash Mohammed, 2019. "Political Connections and Cost of Debt Financing: Empirical Evidence from China," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 9(1), pages 212-216.
    8. Yik-Pui Low, Steven & Foo, Yee-Boon & Gul, Ferdinand A, 2023. "Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1).
    9. Philip Sinnadurai & Ravichandran Subramaniam & Susela Devi & Kyungyoung Ko, 2021. "Government Subsidisation and Shareholder Wealth Impact: Evidence from Malaysia," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-24, August.
    10. Su, Zhong-qin & Fung, Hung-Gay & Huang, Deng-shi & Shen, Chung-Hua, 2014. "Cash dividends, expropriation, and political connections: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 260-272.
    11. Hsin-Yi Chi & Tzu-Ching Weng & Guang-Zheng Chen & Shu-Ping Chen, 2019. "Do Political Connections Affect the Conservative Financial Reporting of Family Firms?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(20), pages 1-20, October.
    12. Khaw, Karren Lee-Hwei & Zainudin, Rozaimah & Rashid, Rasidah Mohd, 2019. "Cost of debt financing: Does political connection matter?," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    13. Chwee Ming Tee & Angelina Seow Voon Yee & Aik Lee Chong, 2018. "Institutional Investors’ Monitoring and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Politically Connected Firms," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 21(04), pages 1-35, December.
    14. Chia, Yee-Ee & Lim, Kian-Ping & Goh, Kim-Leng, 2020. "Liquidity and firm value in an emerging market: Nonlinearity, political connections and corporate ownership," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    15. How, Janice & Verhoeven, Peter & Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi, 2014. "Institutional investors, political connections and analyst following in Malaysia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 158-167.
    16. Blau, Benjamin M. & Brough, Tyler J. & Thomas, Diana W., 2013. "Corporate lobbying, political connections, and the bailout of banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 3007-3017.
    17. Lim, Mable & How, Janice & Verhoeven, Peter, 2014. "Corporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings: Malaysian evidence," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 32-45.
    18. Chwee Ming Tee & Puspavathy Rassiah, 2020. "Ethnic board diversity, earnings quality and institutional investors: evidence from Malaysian corporate boards," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(4), pages 4257-4290, December.
    19. Bona-Sánchez, Carolina & Pérez-Alemán, Jerónimo & Santana-Martín, Domingo Javier, 2019. "Earnings credibility in politically connected family firms," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 316-332.
    20. Phan, Dinh Hoang Bach & Tee, Chwee Ming & Tran, Vuong Thao, 2020. "Do different types of political connections affect corporate investments? Evidence from Malaysia," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political connection; Cost of debt; CEO duality; Audit committees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:36:y:2012:i:5:p:1520-1527. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.