Strategic trade policy and the home bias in firm ownership structure
AbstractIn this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms prefer national ownership and show that full indigenisation occurs in the equilibrium. -- Die internationalen BeteiligungsverhÃ¤ltnisse eines Unternehmens bestimmen die internationale Verteilung der Profite des Unternehmens. Die BeteiligungsverhÃ¤ltnisse beeinflussen deshalb die Anreize fÃ¼r nationale Subventionspolitik im Rahmen strategischer AuÃenhandelspolitik. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird untersucht, welche internationalen BeteiligungsverhÃ¤ltnisse ein gewinnmaximierendes Unternehmen bevorzugen wÃ¼rde, kÃ¶nnte es die internationale Zusammensetzung seiner Eigner wÃ¤hlen. Es wird gezeigt, dass in einem internationalen Cournot-Oligopol ein Gleichgewicht der BeteiligungsverhÃ¤ltnisse existiert, in dem jedes Unternehmen nur Personen als Eigner hat, die in dem gleichen Land ansÃ¤ssig sind, in dem sich der Sitz des betreffenden Unternehmens befindet. Das Ergebnis leistet einen Beitrag zur ErklÃ¤rung des empirisch wohlbekannten Sachverhalts, wonach die internationale Portfoliodiversifikation von Investoren weitaus geringer ist, als es einer optimalen Risikostreuung entsprechen wÃ¼rde.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Japan and the World Economy.
Volume (Year): 15 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505557
Other versions of this item:
- Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Strategic trade policy and the home bias in firm ownership structure," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-25, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad, 2003. "Strategic Trade Policy and the Home Bias in Firm Ownership Structure," CESifo Working Paper Series 892, CESifo Group Munich.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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