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Privatization and The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy

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  • JoAnne Feeney
  • Arye Hillman

Abstract

This paper considers the interdependence between international financial markets, privatization, and strategic trade policies. We describe an economy where portfolio allocations are chosen by risk-averse agents who rationally forecast future trade policies. Assuming a government responsive to the policy preferences of voters, we show that ownership structure affects trade policy through the incentives for lobbying by private agents. Portfolios and trade policy are thus jointly determined in political-economic equilibrium. Privatization of state-owned industry exerts an important influence over the trade policies chosen by domestic and foreign governments by expanding the scope for individual diversification.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 99-05.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:nya:albaec:99-05

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Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A.
Phone: (518) 442-4735
Fax: (518) 442-4736

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Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A.
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Web: http://www.albany.edu/economics/research/workingp/index.shtml

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Cited by:
  1. Jones, Ronald W., 2000. "Private interests and government policy in a global world," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 243-256, June.
  2. Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad, 2003. "Strategic Trade Policy and the Home Bias in Firm Ownership Structure," CESifo Working Paper Series 892, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Ronald W. Jones, 2000. "Private Interests and Government Policy in a Global World," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-051/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Dewit, Gerda, 2001. "Intervention in risky export markets: insurance, strategic action or aid?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 575-592, September.
  5. Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Globalization: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3845, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Svaleryd, Helena & Vlachos, Jonas, 2002. "Markets for risk and openness to trade: how are they related?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 369-395, August.
  7. Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Departure from Free Trade: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3707, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Feeney, JoAnne & Hillman, Arye L., 2004. "Trade liberalization through asset markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 151-167, October.

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