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Privatization and the Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy

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  • Feeney, JoAnne
  • Hillman, Arye L

Abstract

This article considers the interdependence between international financial markets, privatization, and strategic trade policies. We describe an economy where portfolio allocations are chosen by risk-averse agents who rationally forecast future trade policies. Assuming a government responsive to the policy preferences of voters, we show that ownership structure affects trade policy through the incentives for lobbying by private agents. Portfolios and trade policy are thus jointly determined in political-economic equilibrium. Privatization of state-owned industry exerts an important influence over the trade policies chosen by domestic and foreign governments by expanding the scope for individual diversification.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 42 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 535-56

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:42:y:2001:i:2:p:535-56

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Cited by:
  1. Dewit, Gerda, 2001. "Intervention in risky export markets: insurance, strategic action or aid?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 575-592, September.
  2. Svaleryd, Helena & Vlachos, Jonas, 1999. "Markets for Risk and Openness to Trade: How are they Related?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 327, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 10 Sep 2000.
  3. Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad, 2003. "Strategic Trade Policy and the Home Bias in Firm Ownership Structure," CESifo Working Paper Series 892, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Departure from Free Trade: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3707, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Globalization: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3845, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Feeney, JoAnne & Hillman, Arye L., 2004. "Trade liberalization through asset markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 151-167, October.
  7. Ronald W. Jones, 2000. "Private Interests and Government Policy in a Global World," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-051/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Jones, Ronald W., 2000. "Private interests and government policy in a global world," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 243-256, June.

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