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Patent assertion entities and the courts: Injunctive or fee-based relief?

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  • Brander, James A.
  • Spencer, Barbara J.

Abstract

A 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision encouraged district courts to rely more on license fees and less on injunctions as a remedy for patent infringement. This paper provides a simple model in which a patent-owning "patent assertion entity" (PAE) and an infringing firm engage in Nash bargaining over a possible license fee after the PAE initiates an infringement lawsuit. We compare a fee-based regime in which the court imposes a "fair value" license fee if there is no settlement with a regime in which failure to reach a settlement leads to an injunction that disrupts production. The injunctive regime always involves a settlement but, in a fee-based regime, settlements occur only for patents on drastic innovations (as defined by Arrow, 1962). For small incremental innovations, PAEs prefer the injunctive regime because negotiated license fees are higher. For higher value innovations, license fees are lower in the injunctive regime and PAEs would prefer the fee-based regime, contrary to the presumption that injunctive regimes necessarily favor PAEs.

Suggested Citation

  • Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 2021. "Patent assertion entities and the courts: Injunctive or fee-based relief?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:65:y:2021:i:c:s0144818820301873
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105974
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    Cited by:

    1. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 2023. "Intellectual property infringement by foreign firms: Import protection through the ITC or court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    License fee bargaining; Patent litigation; Patent trolls; Royalty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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