The rise and fall of communal liability in ancient law
AbstractIn ancient societies, rules of communal responsibility permitted the imposition of retaliatory sanctions on a wrongdoer's clan. These rules followed the collective ownership structure of early communities. Over time, notions of personal responsibility emerged, terminating the transfer of responsibility from one member to the whole clan. This paper intends to provide an economic explanation for this transition
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Other versions of this item:
- Francesco Parisi & G. Dari Mattiacci, 2003. "The Rise and Fall of Communal Liability in Ancient Law," Working Papers 03-12, Utrecht School of Economics.
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