Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
AbstractWe study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 82 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Many-to-one matching; Deferred acceptance; Nash equilibrium; Dropping strategies; Filled positions; Welfare;
Other versions of this item:
- Paula Jaramillo & Çagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn, 2013. "Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare," Working Papers 686, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Paula Jaramillo & Çagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn, 2013. "Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 010737, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marilda Sotomayor, 2008. "The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 621-640, March.
- Paula Jaramillo & Çagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn, 2012.
"On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets,"
632, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kay & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 010316, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Paula Jaramillo & Kagi Cagatay & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 009997, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
- Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October.
- Alvin Roth, 2008.
"Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
- Roth, Alvin, 2008. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Scholarly Articles 2579651, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," NBER Working Papers 13225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvin E Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-27, June.
- Roth, Alvin E & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1989. "The College Admissions Problem Revisited," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 559-70, May.
- Marilda Sotomayor, 2012. "A further note on the college admission game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 179-193, February.
- Sotomayor, Marilda, 1996. "A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 135-137, March.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 425-27, March.
- Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 197-204, November.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
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