Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic

Contents:

Author Info

  • Sandholm, William H.
  • DokumacI, Emin
  • Lahkar, Ratul

Abstract

We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. At interior population states, the standard microfoundations for the replicator dynamic can be converted into foundations for the projection dynamic by replacing imitation of opponents with "revision driven by insecurity" and direct choice of alternative strategies. Both dynamics satisfy a condition called inflow-outflow symmetry, which causes them to select against strictly dominated strategies at interior states; still, because it is discontinuous at the boundary of the state space, the projection dynamic allows strictly dominated strategies to survive in perpetuity. The two dynamics exhibit qualitatively similar behavior in strictly stable and null stable games. Finally, the projection and replicator dynamics both can be viewed as gradient systems in potential games, the latter after an appropriate transformation of the state space.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4S01WM8-5/2/6d482c5efe2471876df16e7193ee5636
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 64 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 666-683

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:666-683

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  2. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
  3. Sandholm, William H., 2003. "Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 343-378, August.
  4. Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1995. "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Working Paper Series 433, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  5. Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 47-69, January.
  6. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  7. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
  8. Sandholm, William H., 2001. "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
  9. Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, 05.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "The target projection dynamic," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 670, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 13 Aug 2007.
  2. Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2009. "Stable games and their dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1665-1693.e, July.
  3. Laraki, Rida & Mertikopoulos, Panayotis, 2013. "Higher order game dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2666-2695.
  4. Anna Nagurney, 2010. "Formulation and analysis of horizontal mergers among oligopolistic firms with insights into the merger paradox: a supply chain network perspective," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 377-406, October.
  5. Fujishima, Shota, 2013. "Growth, agglomeration, and urban congestion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1168-1181.
  6. Lahkar, Ratul & Sandholm, William H., 2008. "The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 565-590, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:666-683. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.