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Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

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  • Au, Pak Hung
  • Kawai, Keiichi

Abstract

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

Suggested Citation

  • Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi, 2020. "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 56-78.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:119:y:2020:i:c:p:56-78
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
    2. Shiri Alon & Sarah Auster & Gabi Gayer & Stefania Minardi, 2023. "Persuasion With Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_443, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    3. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci & Ludovic Renou, 2021. "Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk," Papers 2102.13562, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
    4. Piotr Dworczak & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2017-2051, September.
    5. Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2018. "Strategic Complexity When Seeking Approval," Research Papers 3615, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    6. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 705-721, October.
    7. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Attraction Versus Persuasion," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202102, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
    8. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
    9. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    10. Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2020. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2006.02048, arXiv.org.
    11. Mustafa Dogan & Ju Hu, 2022. "Consumer search and optimal information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 386-403, June.
    12. Whitmeyer, Joseph & Whitmeyer, Mark, 2021. "Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    13. Wu, Wenhao & Ye, Bohan, 2023. "Competition in persuasion: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 72-89.
    14. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian, 2022. "Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with Partial-informed Senders," Papers 2202.06479, arXiv.org.
    15. Christian Ewerhart, 2022. "Diagonal payoff security and equilibrium existence in quasi-symmetric discontinuous games," ECON - Working Papers 414, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Aug 2022.
    16. Kemal Kivanc Akoz & Arseniy Samsonov, 2023. "Bargaining over information structures," Discussion Papers 2301, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
    17. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2023. "Competitive information disclosure in random search markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 132-153.
    18. Oleg Muratov, 2023. "Entrepreneur–Investor Information Design," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1431-1467, November.
    19. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," Post-Print hal-03700394, HAL.
    20. Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2023. "The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 187-226, May.
    21. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
    22. Alvin Ang & Ser Percival Pena-Reyes, 2020. "Aid Distribution During the COVID-19 Crisis," Department of Economics, Ateneo de Manila University, Working Paper Series 202006, Department of Economics, Ateneo de Manila University.
    23. Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Submission Fees in Risk-Taking Contests," Papers 2108.13506, arXiv.org.
    24. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2021. "A Model of Challenge Funds: How Funding Availability and Selection Rigor Affect Project Quality," Working Paper 1470, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    25. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03700394, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information transmission; Bayesian persuasion; Multiple senders;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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