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Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions

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  • Whitmeyer, Joseph
  • Whitmeyer, Mark

Abstract

Given any purely atomic probability distribution with support on n points, P, any mean-preserving contraction (mpc) of P, Q, with support on m>n points is a mixture of mpcs of P, each with support on at most n points. We illustrate several applications of this result to Bayesian persuasion and information design.

Suggested Citation

  • Whitmeyer, Joseph & Whitmeyer, Mark, 2021. "Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:94:y:2021:i:c:s0304406820301270
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.11.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi, 2020. "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 56-78.
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    6. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
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