Order without law? Property rights during the California gold rush
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Explorations in Economic History.
Volume (Year): 42 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lueck, Dean, 1995. "The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 393-436, October.
- Umbeck, John, 1977. "The California gold rush: A study of emerging property rights," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 197-226, July.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 655-61, September.
- Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135, October.
- David, Paul A & Wright, Gavin, 1997. "Increasing Returns and the Genesis of American Resource Abundance," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 203-45, March.
- Anderson, Terry L & Hill, Peter J, 1990. "The Race for Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 177-97, April.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
- Wright, Brian Davern, 1983. "The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 691-707, September.
- Zerbe, Richard O. & Anderson, C. Leigh, 2001. "Culture And Fairness In The Development Of Institutions In The California Gold Fields," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(01), pages 114-143, March.
- Tobin, Damian & Sun, Laixiang, 2009. "International Listing as a Means to Mobilize the Benefits of Financial Globalization: Micro-level Evidence from China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 825-838, April.
- Ignace Adant & Pierre Fleckinger, 2005. "Controling externalities with asymmetric information : Ferrous Scrap Recycling and the Gold Rush Problem," Working Papers hal-00243017, HAL.
- Libecap, Gary D., 2007.
"The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy,"
The Journal of Economic History,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(02), pages 257-291, June.
- Gary D. Libecap, 2006. "The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy," NBER Working Papers 12598, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Leonard Carlson, 2010. "Similar Societies, Different Solutions: United States Indian Policy in Light of Australian Policy towards Aboriginal Peoples," Emory Economics 1001, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
- Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, 2009. "The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Institutions," NBER Working Papers 14942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Geenen, Sara, 2012. "A dangerous bet: The challenges of formalizing artisanal mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 322-330.
- Kanazawa, Mark, 2006. "Investment in private water development: Property rights and contractual opportunism during the California Gold Rush," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 357-381, April.
- Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, 2009. "The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Institutions," ICER Working Papers 14-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- John R. Boyce & David M. Bruner, 2009. "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: Endogenous Property Rights in a Game of Conflict," Working Papers 09-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- Bart J. Wilson & Taylor Jaworski & Karl Schurter & Andrew Smyth, 2010.
"The Ecological and Civil Mainsprings of Property: An Experimental Economic History of Whalers’ Rules of Capture,"
10-12, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Bart J. Wilson & Taylor Jaworski & Karl E. Schurter & Andrew Smyth, 2012. "The Ecological and Civil Mainsprings of Property: An Experimental Economic History of Whalers' Rules of Capture," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 617-656, October.
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