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Reserve price: Lessons learned from Brazilian electricity procurement auctions

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  • Rego, Erik Eduardo

Abstract

Auctions have been used in several formats in the electric energy industry. In general, regulators may be uncomfortable initiating a reverse auction at a higher-than-expected final price, fearing that participants may sell their energy at an excess profitability. Nevertheless, evidence from electricity procurement auctions conducted in Brazil supports the findings that these types of auctions have the opposite effect. By attracting a larger number of agents, these auctions can trigger stronger competition and lead to lower settlement pricing. Accordingly, the Brazilian cases examined in this article present significant evidence to support this directional theory. In fact, there are some cases of electricity procurement auctions that show that inadequate auction reserve pricing leads to inefficient outcomes and may also cause the auction to fail. On the other hand, auctions with adequate price caps have led to lower final clearing prices, thus contributing to reasonable final energy pricing.

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  • Rego, Erik Eduardo, 2013. "Reserve price: Lessons learned from Brazilian electricity procurement auctions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 217-223.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:60:y:2013:i:c:p:217-223
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Cassetta, Ernesto & Meleo, Linda & Monarca, Umberto & Nava, Consuelo R., 2017. "Is the answer blowin' in the wind (auctions)? An assessment of Italian auction procedures to promote onshore wind energy," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201709, University of Turin.
    5. Liu, Shuangquan & Yang, Qiang & Cai, Huaxiang & Yan, Minghui & Zhang, Maolin & Wu, Dianning & Xie, Mengfei, 2019. "Market reform of Yunnan electricity in southwestern China: Practice, challenges and implications," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-1.
    6. Paulo Henrique de Mello Santana, 2015. "Cost-effectiveness as Energy Policy Mechanisms: The Paradox of Technology-neutral and Technology-specific Policies in the Short and Long Term," Working Papers Working Paper 2015-02, Regional Research Institute, West Virginia University.
    7. Poudineh, Rahmatallah & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2014. "Distributed generation, storage, demand response and energy efficiency as alternatives to grid capacity enhancement," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 222-231.
    8. Romeiro, Diogo Lisbona & Almeida, Edmar Luiz Fagundes de & Losekann, Luciano, 2020. "Systemic value of electricity sources – What we can learn from the Brazilian experience?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    9. de Mello Santana, Paulo Henrique, 2016. "Cost-effectiveness as energy policy mechanisms: The paradox of technology-neutral and technology-specific policies in the short and long term," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1216-1222.
    10. Ferreira, Jacson Hudson Inácio & Camacho, José Roberto & Malagoli, Juliana Almansa & Júnior, Sebastião Camargo Guimarães, 2016. "Assessment of the potential of small hydropower development in Brazil," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 380-387.

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