Supply chain coordination with insurance contract
AbstractWe propose an insurance contract under which the supplier shares the risk of overstock and understock with the retailer, improving the efficiency of the supply chain with a newsvendor-type product. We first show that the insurance contract could coordinate the supply chain, and obtain bargaining solution in the supply chain model. Then we investigate the effects of agents' risk aversion on the supply chain model and acquire the Pareto-optimal solution through the mean-variance approach. After that, we compare the insurance contract with the revenue sharing contract, focusing particularly on their differences. Finally, extensive numerical studies are conducted, and managerial implications are proposed.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.
Volume (Year): 205 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor
Supply chain management Game theory Risk analysis Insurance contract;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Löffler, Clemens & Pfeiffer, Thomas & Schneider, Georg, 2012. "Controlling for supplier switching in the presence of real options and asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(3), pages 690-700.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.