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Ordering policy and coordination of a supply chain with two-period demand uncertainty


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  • Chen, Kebing
  • Xiao, Tiaojun
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    We develop a two-period game model of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain to investigate the optimal decisions of the players, where stock-out and holding costs are incorporated into the model. The demand at each period is stochastic and price sharply drops in mid-life. We assume the retailer has a single order opportunity, and decides how much inventory to keep in the middle of selling season. We show that both the price-protection mid-life and end-of-life returns (PME) scheme and the only mid-life and end-of-life returns (ME) scheme may achieve channel coordination and access a 'win-win' situation under some conditions. The larger the lowest expected profit of the retailer, the lower the possibility of 'win-win' situation will be. Combined with the analysis of feasible regions for coordination policies, we find that PME scheme is not always better than ME scheme from the perspective of implementable mechanism. Finally, we find that adopting the dispose-down-to (DDT) policy can bring a larger improvement of the expected channel profit in the centralized setting, and it is interesting that by using DDT policy, double marginalization occurs only at Period 1, and however, does not plague the retailer in Period 2.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.

    Volume (Year): 215 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (December)
    Pages: 347-357

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:215:y:2011:i:2:p:347-357

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    Keywords: Supply chain management Channel coordination Game theory Buyback contract;


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    Cited by:
    1. Egri, Péter & Váncza, József, 2013. "A distributed coordination mechanism for supply networks with asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 226(3), pages 452-460.
    2. Chen, Kebing, 2012. "Procurement strategies and coordination mechanism of the supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple suppliers," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 125-135.


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