Vertical mergers with input substitution: Double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109818
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- Serge Moresi & Marius Schwartz, 2021. "Vertical Mergers with Input Substitution: Double Marginalization, Foreclosure and Welfare," Working Papers gueconwpa~21-21-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Moresi, Serge & Schwartz, Marius, 2021.
"Vertical mergers with input substitution: Double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
- Serge Moresi & Marius Schwartz, 2021. "Vertical Mergers with Input Substitution: Double Marginalization, Foreclosure and Welfare," Working Papers gueconwpa~21-21-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Chen, Yongmin, 2001.
"On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 667-685, Winter.
- Yongmin Chen, 2000. "On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0383, Econometric Society.
- Inderst, Roman & Valletti, Tommaso, 2011. "Incentives for input foreclosure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 820-831, August.
- Moresi, Serge & Schwartz, Marius, 2017. "Strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 137-161.
- Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 347-347.
- Arya, Anil & Mittendorf, Brian & Sappington, David E.M., 2008. "Outsourcing, vertical integration, and price vs. quantity competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-16, January.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Serge Moresi & David Reitman & Steven C. Salop & Yianis Sarafidis, 2021. "Vertical Mergers in a Model of Upstream Monopoly and Incomplete Information," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 363-380, September.
- Moresi, Serge & Schwartz, Marius, 2021.
"Vertical mergers with input substitution: Double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
- Serge Moresi & Marius Schwartz, 2021. "Vertical Mergers with Input Substitution: Double Marginalization, Foreclosure and Welfare," Working Papers gueconwpa~21-21-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Konstantinos G. Papadopoulos & Emmanuel Petrakis & Panagiotis Skartados, 2022. "The ambiguous competitive effects of passive partial forward ownership," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(2), pages 540-568, October.
- Nicolas Pasquier, 2024. "Decentralization and Consumer Welfare with Substitutes or Complements," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(3), pages 449-469, May.
- Papadopoulos, Konstantinos G. & Skartados, Panagiotis, 2021. "The ambiguous competitive effects of passive partial forward integration," UC3M Working papers. Economics 33354, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
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More about this item
Keywords
Vertical mergers; Foreclosure; Input substitution; Antitrust;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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