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Understanding the impact of demand shocks on the container port industry

Author

Listed:
  • Daniele Crotti

    (University of Insubria)

  • Claudio Ferrari

    (University of Genova)

  • Alessio Tei

    (University of Genova)

Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic has severely impacted the world economy, generating an unprecedented shock that pushed carriers to adapt to the collapse of demand. Most of the related adaptation actions (e.g., blank sailings) appear as temporary initiatives being insufficient to reach a long run equilibrium. Moreover, while carriers managed to adjust their own supplied capacity to the ongoing crisis, the port sector has been greatly impacted by the fall in transport demand, not being able to counteract the demand shortages as effectively as the carriers. Against this backdrop, the paper introduces a model for assessing the effects of demand shocks (e.g., due to the pandemic) on the integration strategies of carriers. We focus on the possible initiatives that demand shocks may trigger on the horizontal and vertical integration among the actors of the shipping industry. In doing so, the present study provides useful insights for better understanding potential future market modifications and their impact on social welfare. Using non-cooperative games, profit-maximising strategies, in case of such integrations, are compared in order to study how carriers and terminal operators might react to demand shocks in the medium and long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniele Crotti & Claudio Ferrari & Alessio Tei, 2022. "Understanding the impact of demand shocks on the container port industry," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 24(4), pages 778-805, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:marecl:v:24:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1057_s41278-022-00222-0
    DOI: 10.1057/s41278-022-00222-0
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