Vertical Mergers in a Model of Upstream Monopoly and Incomplete Information
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-021-09833-y
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Cited by:
- Roger D. Blair, 2021. "The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 133-138, September.
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More about this item
Keywords
Vertical mergers; Monopoly; Foreclosure; Incomplete information; Antitrust;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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