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Unidimensional median voter results in probabilistic voting models

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  • Coughlin, Peter J.

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  • Coughlin, Peter J., 1984. "Unidimensional median voter results in probabilistic voting models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 9-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:14:y:1984:i:1:p:9-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-121, February.
    2. Hinich, Melvin J., 1977. "Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 208-219, December.
    3. Coughlin, Peter J., 1984. "Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-12, October.
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