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Optimal tranching with diverse beliefs

Author

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  • Guo, Guixia
  • Wang, Frank Yong
  • Wei, Xu

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the optimal selling strategy for an asset securitization originator (the issuer) when the potential buyers hold diverse beliefs. We find that the tranching process is beneficial to the issuer because it increases the total sale price. We also consider the optimal tranching strategy that maximizes the revenue of the issuer. This helps explain the widespread use of the tranching technique in the asset securitization practice. Our findings are also enlightening to understand the price bubble problem when the junior tranche is interpreted as a collateral.

Suggested Citation

  • Guo, Guixia & Wang, Frank Yong & Wei, Xu, 2014. "Optimal tranching with diverse beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 222-226.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:2:p:222-226
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.030
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Franke, Günter & Herrmann, Markus & Weber, Thomas, 2012. "Loss Allocation in Securitization Transactions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(5), pages 1125-1153, October.
    2. Peter M. DeMarzo, 2005. "The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 1-35.
    3. John Geanakoplos & Ana Fostel, 2008. "Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1211-1244, September.
    4. Semyon Malamud & Huaxia Rui & Andrew B. Whinston, 2012. "Optimal Risk Sharing with Limited Liability," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 12-05, Swiss Finance Institute.
    5. Alp Simsek, 2013. "Belief Disagreements and Collateral Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 1-53, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Askar, S.S. & Alnowibet, K., 2016. "Cooperation versus noncooperation: Cournot duopolistic game based on delay and time-dependent parameters," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 580-584.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal tranching; Diverse beliefs; Second order stochastic dominance; Price bubble;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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