A folk theorem for endogenous reference points
AbstractWe establish a folk theorem for infinitely repeated game protocols with players whose preferences exhibit backward-looking reference dependence.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 112 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Reference dependence Habit formation Folk theorem;
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