This paper analyzes a liquidity run model in which investors strategically acquire private information. The availability of information can eliminate the multiplicity typical for models without private information. Even for intermediate priors equilibria without private information can now be unique.
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Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993.
"Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
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Other versions:
Gorton, Gary & Winton, Andrew, 2003.
"Financial intermediation,"
Handbook of the Economics of Finance,
in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 431-552
Elsevier.
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