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Material transfer agreements: An economic and econometric analysis

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  • Onofri, Laura

Abstract

This paper uses econometric analysis for understanding the determinants that affect the payment mechanism in material transfer agreements (MTAs). These contracts regulate the exchange of peculiar ecosystem services (genetic and biological materials) between a provider and a recipient of the service. The paper uses a set of “model” contracts from the late 2000s, gathered from the U.N. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD). Empirical results show that the probability that a payment scheme is included in the contract negatively depends on the presence of an acknowledgment obligation to the provider of the material. Probably aware of the complexity and uncertainty of the recipient's research activity, the provider (and the CBD) requires to be compensated through the recognition of his/her important input to the research venture. In economics, this can be interpreted as payment in terms of moral satisfaction.

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  • Onofri, Laura, 2014. "Material transfer agreements: An economic and econometric analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 422-430.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:107:y:2014:i:c:p:422-430
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.09.017
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