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Differential fecundity and child custody

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  • Garcia-Moran, Eva M.

Abstract

Despite U.S. child custody laws favoring joint custody since the mid 1970s, mother sole custody is still the main custody arrangement. This paper proposes that differences in fecundity between men and women play a role in accounting for this fact. Men are more likely to have more children after a divorce because they are fertile for more years than women. This acts as an incentive for couples to agree on mothers’ sole custody. I build a general equilibrium model of endogenous marriage, divorce and remarriage with differential fecundity between women and men where couples choose custody allocation. Custody depends on the fecundity differential and father’s time spent with children. I calibrate my model to be consistent with observed U.S. child custody arrangements and marriage statistics and using changes over time in assisted reproductive technology (ART) and father’s time spent with children I quantify the effect of the fecundity differential on child custody. Results show that if assisted reproductive technology was not available, the current share of couples with joint custody would be 15.67% lower. Considering that fathers’ time with children has also changed over time, I find that a reduction in the fecundity differential accounts for an increase in the share of couples with joint custody of 4%.

Suggested Citation

  • Garcia-Moran, Eva M., 2018. "Differential fecundity and child custody," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 156-170.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:90:y:2018:i:c:p:156-170
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2018.02.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "An Investment-and-Marriage Model with Differential Fecundity: On the College Gender Gap," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(5), pages 1464-1486.
    2. Daniel R. Meyer & Marcia Carlson & Md Moshi Ul Alam, 2022. "Increases in shared custody after divorce in the United States," Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 46(38), pages 1137-1162.
    3. Zhang, Hanzhe, 2019. "An Investment-and-Marriage Model with Differential Fecundity," Working Papers 2019-11, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Remarriage; Child custody; Fecundity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

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