IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/dyncon/v52y2015icp119-135.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies

Author

Listed:
  • Sunakawa, Takeki

Abstract

This study examines the quantitative properties of optimal sustainable monetary policies using a monetary model with a stabilization bias. As in Kurozumi (2008), the optimal sustainable policy is a strategy considered in the absence of commitment technologies; however it is implemented following an optimal quasi-sustainable policy derived by assuming that the commitment technologies are present. This study finds that solving for the policy function of the optimal quasi-sustainable policy yields a result basically identical to the Ramsey-optimal commitment policy under a set of parameters commonly used in the literature. The simulation shows two further results: policymakers have incentive to deviate from the Ramsey-optimal commitment policy when the lagged output gap is large and the optimal quasi-sustainable policy endogenously diminishes the steadfastness of policymakers׳ commitment.

Suggested Citation

  • Sunakawa, Takeki, 2015. "A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 119-135.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:52:y:2015:i:c:p:119-135
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.12.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188914003273
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.12.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1998. "An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy: Expanded Version," NBER Technical Working Papers 0233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M., 2006. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(7), pages 1877-1905, October.
    3. Christiano, Lawrence J. & Fisher, Jonas D. M., 2000. "Algorithms for solving dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(8), pages 1179-1232, July.
    4. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    5. Anton Nakov, 2008. "Optimal and Simple Monetary Policy Rules with Zero Floor on the Nominal Interest Rate," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(2), pages 73-127, June.
    6. Albert Marcet & Ramon Marimon, 2019. "Recursive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1589-1631, September.
    7. Willem Van Zandweghe & Alexander L. Wolman, 2019. "Discretionary monetary policy in the Calvo model," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), pages 387-418, January.
    8. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M., 2007. "Discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 728-752, April.
    9. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    10. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(1), pages 175-195.
    11. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    12. Tauchen, George, 1986. "Finite state markov-chain approximations to univariate and vector autoregressions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 177-181.
    13. Jensen, Christian & McCallum, Bennett T., 2002. "The non-optimality of proposed monetary policy rules under timeless perspective commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 163-168, October.
    14. Dennis, Richard, 2010. "When is discretion superior to timeless perspective policymaking?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 266-277, April.
    15. Anderson, Gary S. & Kim, Jinill & Yun, Tack, 2010. "Using a projection method to analyze inflation bias in a micro-founded model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 1572-1581, September.
    16. Kurozumi, Takushi, 2008. "Optimal sustainable monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 1277-1289, October.
    17. Ireland, Peter N., 1997. "Sustainable monetary policies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 87-108, November.
    18. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August.
    19. Stephan Sauer, 2010. "Discretion Rather Than Rules? When Is Discretionary Policymaking Better Than the Timeless Perspective?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(2), pages 1-29, June.
    20. Loisel, Olivier, 2008. "Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(11), pages 3718-3742, November.
    21. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
    22. Michael Woodford, 1999. "Commentary : how should monetary policy be conducted in an era of price stability?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 277-316.
    23. Taisuke Nakata, 2014. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Working Papers e087, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    24. Bodenstein, Martin & Hebden, James & Nunes, Ricardo, 2012. "Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 135-149.
    25. Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1997. "An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, pages 297-361, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    26. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    27. Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2002. "International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 907-928, May.
    28. Marc P. Giannoni, 2010. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules in a Forward-Looking Model, and Inflation Stabilization versus Price-Level Stabilization," NBER Working Papers 15986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    29. Judd, Kenneth L., 1992. "Projection methods for solving aggregate growth models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 410-452, December.
    30. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jean Barthélemy & Eric Mengus, 2017. "Credibility and Monetary Policy," Sciences Po publications 2017-01, Sciences Po.
    2. Taisuke Nakata & Takeki Sunakawa, 2019. "Credible Forward Guidance," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-037, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Jean Barthélemy & Eric Mengus, 2017. "Credibility and Monetary Policy," Sciences Po publications 2017-01, Sciences Po.
    4. Batista, Quentin & Nakata, Taisuke & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2023. "Credible Forward Guidance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    5. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    6. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    7. Jean Barthélemy & Eric Mengus, 2017. "Credibility and Monetary Policy," Working Papers hal-03457527, HAL.
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1lu2rbsv0n8pkqid81q0tfof3f is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Fujiwara, Ippei & Kam, Timothy & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2019. "Sustainable international monetary policy cooperation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 1-1.
    10. Ippei Fujiwara & Timothy Kam & Takeki Sunakawa, 2016. "A note on imperfect credibility," CAMA Working Papers 2016-37, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    11. Fujiwara, Ippei & Kam, Timothy & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2019. "On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 22-25.
    12. Taisuke Nakata, 2014. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Working Papers e087, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kurozumi, Takushi, 2008. "Optimal sustainable monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 1277-1289, October.
    2. Loisel, Olivier, 2008. "Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(11), pages 3718-3742, November.
    3. Jean Barthélemy & Eric Mengus, 2017. "Credibility and Monetary Policy," Working Papers hal-03457527, HAL.
    4. Boneva, Lena & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2015. "Threshold-based forward guidance: hedging the zero bound," Bank of England working papers 561, Bank of England.
    5. Jean Barthélemy & Eric Mengus, 2017. "Credibility and Monetary Policy," Sciences Po publications 2017-01, Sciences Po.
    6. Boneva, Lena & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2018. "Threshold-based forward guidance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 138-155.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1lu2rbsv0n8pkqid81q0tfof3f is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Batista, Quentin & Nakata, Taisuke & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2023. "Credible Forward Guidance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    9. Jean Barthélemy & Eric Mengus, 2017. "Credibility and Monetary Policy," Working Papers hal-03457527, HAL.
    10. Anderson, Gary S. & Kim, Jinill & Yun, Tack, 2010. "Using a projection method to analyze inflation bias in a micro-founded model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 1572-1581, September.
    11. Bodenstein, Martin & Hebden, James & Nunes, Ricardo, 2012. "Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 135-149.
    12. Nakata, Taisuke & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2019. "Conservatism and liquidity traps," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 37-47.
    13. Taisuke Nakata & Takeki Sunakawa, 2019. "Credible Forward Guidance," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-037, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    14. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/713kqq1pgu80lr8fn0lsuuh8lf is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Roberto M. Billi, 2011. "Optimal Inflation for the US Economy," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 29-52, July.
    16. Barthélemy, Jean & Mengus, Eric, 2018. "The signaling effect of raising inflation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 488-516.
    17. Ngo, Phuong V., 2014. "Optimal discretionary monetary policy in a micro-founded model with a zero lower bound on nominal interest rate," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 44-65.
    18. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
    19. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/713kqq1pgu80lr8fn0lsuuh8lf is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2013. "Fiscal Multipliers and Policy Coordination," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Jordi Galí (ed.),Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance, edition 1, volume 17, chapter 6, pages 175-234, Central Bank of Chile.
    21. Richard Dennis & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2013. "Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures with Discretionary Policymaking," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-611, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    22. Fujiwara, Ippei & Kam, Timothy & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2019. "On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 22-25.
    23. Newby, Elisa, 2012. "The suspension of the gold standard as sustainable monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1498-1519.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal monetary policy; Time inconsistency; Sustainable plans; Timeless perspective;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:52:y:2015:i:c:p:119-135. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.