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Maximizing the firm's value to society through ethical business decisions: Incorporating ‘moral debt’ claims

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  • Guidi, Marco G.D.
  • Hillier, Joe
  • Tarbert, Heather

Abstract

We argue that all three forms of justice (economic, legal, distributive) require to be incorporated into the firm's business decisions in order to protect stakeholders’ alienable and inalienable rights. In addition, the firm has ‘moral debt’ obligations which require to be distributed fairly amongst all stakeholders. We develop a model that demonstrates that just distribution of stakeholders’ ‘moral debt’ and residual claims leads to the maximization of the firm's value to society in the long-run.

Suggested Citation

  • Guidi, Marco G.D. & Hillier, Joe & Tarbert, Heather, 2008. "Maximizing the firm's value to society through ethical business decisions: Incorporating ‘moral debt’ claims," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 603-619.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:crpeac:v:19:y:2008:i:5:p:603-619
    DOI: 10.1016/j.cpa.2007.01.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Guidi, Marco G.D. & Hillier, Joe & Tarbert, Heather, 2010. "Successfully reshaping the ownership relationship by reducing ‘moral debt’ and justly distributing residual claims: The cases from Scott Bader Commonwealth and the John Lewis Partnership," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 318-328.
    2. Gray, Rob & Gray, Sue, 2011. "Accountability and human rights: A tentative exploration and a commentary," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 22(8), pages 781-789.

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