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The Private Finance Initiative: risk, uncertainty and the state

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  • Froud, Julie

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  • Froud, Julie, 2003. "The Private Finance Initiative: risk, uncertainty and the state," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 567-589, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:28:y:2003:i:6:p:567-589
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    1. J. M. Keynes, 1937. "The General Theory of Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 51(2), pages 209-223.
    2. Paul Davidson, 1991. "Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 129-143, Winter.
    3. Lyons, Bruce R, 1996. "Empirical Relevance of Efficient Contract Theory: Inter-firm Contracts," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 12(4), pages 27-52, Winter.
    4. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    5. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    6. Heald, David, 1997. "Privately Financed Capital in Public Services," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 65(5), pages 568-598, December.
    7. Gietzmann, Miles B., 1996. "Incomplete contracts and the make or buy decision: Governance design and attainable flexibility," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 611-626, August.
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