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A survey of models for determining optimal audit strategies

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  • Appelgren, Leif

Abstract

The problem studied in this survey is how to optimize the allocation of audit resources over an auditee population with respect to available population statistics. The auditees are assumed to optimize their expected utility based on information about the audit strategy. This survey is limited to models where the auditee can vary the fraud amount along a continuous scale.

Suggested Citation

  • Appelgren, Leif, 2020. "A survey of models for determining optimal audit strategies," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:advacc:v:48:y:2020:i:c:s0882611020300250
    DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2020.100455
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic auditing; Optimization; Game theory; Tax fraud; Social benefit fraud; Accounting fraud;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing

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