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Oligopoly and Collusion in the Colombian Electricity Market

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge Barrientos Marin

    (Department of Economics, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Antioquia, Medellin, Ant, 050001 Colombia)

  • Hector Gomez Marin

    (Department of Economics, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Antioquia, Medellin, Ant, 050001 Colombia)

Abstract

The Wholesale Electricity Market WEM in Colombia was created with Laws 142 and 143 of 1994 with the aim of promoting and preserving competition among agents and guaranteeing an efficient energy spot price. However, in practice the market works as an oligopoly in competition; evidence indicates there is market concentration, without reaching abuse of dominant position or price collusion, at least not explicitly. This paper develops a game model with incomplete information, in which there is at least a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with implicit collusion among agents. That is, it is highly likely that, under certain conditions, some generators tacitly follow the price strategies of agents with greater installed generation capacity (pivotal) and hence propose similar bid prices. The empirical analysis shows that scenarios of radical and similar increases in bid prices, for different generators, are a pattern present in the WEM.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Barrientos Marin & Hector Gomez Marin, 2022. "Oligopoly and Collusion in the Colombian Electricity Market," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 12(3), pages 125-134, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eco:journ2:2022-03-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity markets; oligopoly; collusion; incomplete information; Bayesian equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices

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