IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-17-00629.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Inducing e-waste sorting investment under imperfect information

Author

Listed:
  • Prudence Dato

    (Savoie Mont Blanc University-IREGE)

Abstract

In this paper, we apply the theory of incentives to the e-waste market. We want to show how to induce firms in the North to undertake sorting investment to help implement an alternative e-waste market of a joint trade in reusable and non-reusable e-waste. Results show that, if the sorting cost is low, the optimal contract to induce sorting investment and to implement the alternative e-waste market for a joint trade in reusable and non-reusable e-waste is the Baron-Myerson contract. One of the direct implication of the results is that, if the cost is not too high to deter the sorting investment, the firm in the South should give incentives to the firm in the North to invest in sorting so that the alternative e-waste market can easily be implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Prudence Dato, 2018. "Inducing e-waste sorting investment under imperfect information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 629-637.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00629
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2018/Volume38/EB-18-V38-I1-P61.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Prudence Dato, 2017. "Economic analysis of e-waste market," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(6), pages 815-837, December.
    2. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 174-193, November.
    3. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-578, June.
    4. Keisaku Higashida, 2012. "Trade in Secondhand Goods, Monitoring of Illegal Trade, and Import Quotas on Legal Trade," Discussion Paper Series 90, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jun 2012.
    5. Bernard, Sophie, 2015. "North–south trade in reusable goods: Green design meets illegal shipments of waste," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 22-35.
    6. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
    7. Compte, Olivier & Jehiel, Philippe, 2008. "Gathering information before signing a contract: A screening perspective," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 206-212, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
    2. Terstiege, Stefan, 2013. "Precontractual Investigation and Sequential Screening," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 429, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. Justin Downs, 2021. "Information gathering by overconfident agents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 554-568, August.
    4. Malcomson James M, 2009. "Principal and Expert Agent," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-36, May.
    5. Samuel C. A. Pereira, 2021. "On the precision of information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 569-584, August.
    6. Terstiege, Stefan, 2012. "Endogenous information and stochastic contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 535-547.
    7. Terstiege, Stefan, 2016. "Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 70-87.
    8. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    9. Michi Nishihara & Takashi Shibata, 2011. "The effects of costly exploration on optimal investment timing," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(3), pages 105-112, August.
    10. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques & Rodivilov, Alexander, 2020. "Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    11. , & ,, 2012. "A principal-agent model of sequential testing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    12. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(4), pages 1516-1544.
    13. Li, Yunan, 2019. "Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 279-328.
    14. Jacques Crémer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Zheng, 2009. "Auctions with costly information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 41-72, January.
    15. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
    16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    17. Terstiege, Stefan, 2016. "On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 60-63.
    18. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 163-200, July.
    19. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 355-372, June.
    20. Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng, 2004. "Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 1420, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    E-waste; imperfect information; international trade; market;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00629. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.