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The core of a housing market with externalities

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  • Ismail Saglam

    ()
    (Bogazici University)

  • Ayse Mumcu

    ()
    (Bogazici University)

Abstract

It is known that the core of a housing market always exists and contains a unique matching when agents have independent preferences. We show that when preferences of agents are interdependent, there are housing markets with an empty core as well as housing markets with a core containing more than one matching.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume3/EB-07C70026A.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 57 ()
Pages: 1-5

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c70026

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Keywords: core.;

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References

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  1. Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2006. "One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences," MPRA Paper 1908, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  3. Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2007. "A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 46-71, April.
  4. Sasaki, Hiroo & Toda, Manabu, 1996. "Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 93-108, July.
  5. Roth, Alvin E. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1977. "Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 131-137, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Rationalizability of One-to-One Matchings with Externalities," Working Papers, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics 0807, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
  2. Gudmundsson, Jens & Habis, Helga, 2013. "Assignment Games with Externalities," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2013:27, Lund University, Department of Economics.

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