A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses
AbstractWe show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 4 (2006)
Issue (Month): 24 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena, 2006. "A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal Clauses," Working Papers 92, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2006.
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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