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A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses

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  • Leandro Arozamena

    ()
    (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)

  • Federico Weinschelbaum

    ()
    (Universidad de San Andres)

Abstract

We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2006/Volume4/EB-06D40010A.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2006)
Issue (Month): 24 ()
Pages: 1-5

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06d40010

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Keywords: Auctions;

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  1. Naegelen, Florence & Mougeot, Michel, 1998. "Discriminatory public procurement policy and cost reduction incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 349-367, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2009. "Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 23-26, July.
  2. Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena, 2004. "The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings, Econometric Society 180, Econometric Society.
  3. Pierre M. Picard & Ridwan D. Rusli, 2012. "State Owned Firms: Private Debt, Cost Revelation and Welfare," CREA Discussion Paper Series 12-10, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
  4. Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2010. "On Favoritism in Auctions with Entry," Working Papers, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia 103, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2010.
  5. Constantino Hevia & Martin Gonzalez-Rozada & Martin Sola & Fabio Spagnolo, 2014. "Estimating and Forecasting the Yield Curve Using a Markov Switching Dynamic Nelson and Siegel Model," BCAM Working Papers, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics 1403, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
  6. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2008. "Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets," Working Papers 355, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  7. Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Roberto Cortes Conde, 2008. "Spanish America Colonial Patterns: The Rio de La Plata," Working Papers, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia 96, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2008.

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