On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules
AbstractThe strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. We show that under simultaneous price competition and under leader-follower price competition (with the discriminatory firm being the leader), the pricing policy game is not, as stated by Thisse and Vives (1988), a Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 12 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Aguirre Pérez, Ignacio & Martín Arroyuelos, Ana María, 2001. "On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules," BILTOKI 2001-04, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística).
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
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"On the strategic choice of spatial price policy,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-793, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Hummels, David & Levinsohn, James A, 1993. "Product Differentiation as a," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 445-49, May.
- Phlips,Louis, 1983. "The Economics of Price Discrimination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521283946, October.
- Aguirre Pérez, Ignacio & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz, 2003.
"Product Differentiation with Consumer Arbitrage,"
2003-04, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística).
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