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Intergenerational Fiscal Constitutions: How to Protect Future Generations Using Land Taxes and Federalism

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  • John Conley

    ()
    (University of Illiniois)

  • Antonio Rangel

    ()
    (Standford Univerisity and NBER)

Abstract

This paper studies how to design a fiscal constitution that protects future generations from expropriation and generates optimal investment in intergenerational public goods. We study how to accomplish these goals by changing the level of government to which different types of intergenerational public goods are assigned, and the tax base of the different jurisdictions. We show that land taxation is the essential instrument for policies that mostly generate fiscal spillovers, such as debt and public infrastructure. By contrast, interjurisdictional competition is required for policies that mostly generate direct spillovers, such as irreversible environmental damages. Furthermore, we show that it is possible to design a fiscal constitution that generates full capitalization of fiscal spillovers, but in general, not one that generates full capitalization of direct spillovers.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 28 (2001)
Issue (Month): 17 ()
Pages: A0

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01aa0021

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  1. Dennis Epple & Katherine Schipper, 1981. "Municipal pension funding: A theory and some evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 141-178, January.
  2. Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1997. "Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1121-66, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Marco Bassetto, 2008. "Public investment and budget rules for state vs. local governments," Working Paper Series WP-08-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  2. Hilber, Christian A. L., 2007. "New Housing Supply and the Dilution of Social Capital," MPRA Paper 5134, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Libman, Alexander, 2005. "Взаимодействие Государственных И Частных Структур В Интеграционных Группировах: Теоретические Подходы И Оп," MPRA Paper 17044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Christian A. L. Hilber & Christopher J. Mayer, 2002. "Why do households without children support local public schools? linking house price capitalization to school spending," Working Papers 02-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  5. Paul R. Bergin & Reuven Glick, 2003. "Endogenous Tradability and Macroeconomic Implications," NBER Working Papers 9739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Reuven Glick & Paul Bergin, 2004. "Productivity and Tradability," 2004 Meeting Papers 327, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Marco Bassetto, 2009. "The Research Agenda: Marco Bassetto on the Quantitative Evaluation of Fiscal Policy Rules," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), April.

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