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Retrospective and Prospective Benefit-Cost Analyses of U.S. Anti-Smoking Policies 1

Author

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  • Jin, Lawrence
  • Kenkel, Don
  • Liu, Feng
  • Wang, Hua

Abstract

Regulatory policies designed to improve societal welfare by “nudging†consumers to make better choices are increasingly popular. The application of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) to this sort of regulation confronts difficult theoretical and applied issues. In this analysis we contribute a worked example of behavioral BCA of U.S. anti-smoking policies. Our conceptual framework extends the standard market-based approach to BCA to allow for individual failures to make lifetime-utility-maximizing choices of cigarette consumption. We discuss how our market-based approach compares to the health benefits approach and the “consumer surplus offset†controversy in recent BCAs of several health-related regulations. We use a dynamic population model to make counterfactual simulations of smoking prevalence rates and cigarette demand over time. In our retrospective BCA the simulation results imply that the overall impact of anti-smoking policies from 1964 to 2010 is to reduce the total cigarette consumption by 28%. At a discount rate of 3% the 1964–present value of the consumer benefits from anti-smoking policies through 2010 is estimated to be $573 billion ($2010). Although we are unable to develop a hard estimate of the policies’ costs, we discuss evidence that suggests the consumer benefits substantially outweigh the costs. We then turn to a prospective BCA of future anti-smoking Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations. At a discount rate of 3%, the 2010–present value of the consumer benefits 30 years into the future from a simulated FDA tobacco regulation is estimated to be $100 billion. However, the nature of potential FDA tobacco regulations suggests that they might impose additional costs on consumers that make it less clear that the net benefits of the regulations will be positive.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin, Lawrence & Kenkel, Don & Liu, Feng & Wang, Hua, 2015. "Retrospective and Prospective Benefit-Cost Analyses of U.S. Anti-Smoking Policies 1," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 154-186, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jbcoan:v:6:y:2015:i:01:p:154-186_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2005. "Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with Non-Standard Decision-Makers," NBER Working Papers 11518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. B. Douglas Bernheim, 2009. "Behavioral Welfare Economics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 267-319, 04-05.
    3. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2009. "Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 51-104.
    4. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2007. "Toward Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 464-470, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Helen G. Levy & Edward C. Norton & Jeffrey A. Smith, 2018. "Tobacco Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis: How Should We Value Foregone Consumer Surplus?," American Journal of Health Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1-25, Winter.
    2. Sophie Massin & Maxence Miéra, 2020. "Measuring consumer surplus in the case of addiction: A re-examination of the rational benchmark algebra," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(4), pages 3171-3181.
    3. Philip DeCicca & Donald Kenkel & Feng Liu & Hua Wang, 2017. "Behavioral Welfare Economics and FDA Tobacco Regulations," Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, in: Human Capital and Health Behavior, volume 25, pages 143-179, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    4. Donald S. Kenkel & Sida Peng & Michael F. Pesko & Hua Wang, 2020. "Mostly harmless regulation? Electronic cigarettes, public policy, and consumer welfare," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(11), pages 1364-1377, November.
    5. Bo Feng & Michael F. Pesko, 2019. "Revisiting the Effects of Tobacco Retailer Compliance Inspections on Youth Tobacco Use," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 509-532, Fall.
    6. Robinson, Lisa A. & Viscusi, W. Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2016. "Efficient Warnings, Not "Wolf or Rabbit" Warnings," Working Paper Series 16-033, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    7. Hunt Allcott & Judd B. Kessler, 2015. "The Welfare Effects of Nudges: A Case Study of Energy Use Social Comparisons," NBER Working Papers 21671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Hunt Allcott & Charlie Rafkin, 2020. "Optimal Regulation of E-cigarettes: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 27000, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Trinidad Beleche & Nellie Lew & Rosemarie L. Summers & J. Laron Kirby, 2018. "Are Graphic Warning Labels Stopping Millions of Smokers? A Comment on Huang, Chaloupka, and Fong," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 15(2), pages 129–157-1, May.
    10. G. Mzhavanadze & D. Yanin, 2023. "The Potential Impact of E-cigarettes on the Life-Years Lost from Conventional Smoking in the Russian Federation," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 253-274, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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