IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cto/journl/v6y1987i3p851-868.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic Significance of British Labor Law Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Charles G. Hanson

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles G. Hanson, 1987. "Economic Significance of British Labor Law Reform," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(3), pages 851-868, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:6:y:1987:i:3:p:851-868
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1987/1/cj6n3-8.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2013. "The political economy of antitrust," Chapters, in: Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand (ed.), The International Handbook of Competition – Second Edition, chapter 6, pages 169-206, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Schmidt, Klaus-Dieter, 1989. "Lehren aus der Arbeitslosigkeit: Das Vereinigte Königreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich," Kiel Working Papers 383, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Soltwedel, Rüdiger & Bothe, Adrian & Hoffmeyer, Martin & Laaser, Claus-Friedrich & Lammers, Konrad & Merz, Monika & Reuter, Dieter, 1990. "Regulierungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt der Bundesrepublik," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 418, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Schmidt, Klaus-Dieter, 1990. "Mehr Arbeitsplätze durch weniger Regulierung: Britische Erfahrungen mit einer anderen Arbeitsmarktpolitik," Kiel Working Papers 406, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Deepak Lal, 1995. "Why Growth Rates Differ: The Political Economy of Social Capability in 21 Developing Countries," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Bon Ho Koo & Dwight H. Perkins (ed.), Social Capability and Long-Term Economic Growth, chapter 14, pages 288-309, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Roe, Terry L., 1992. "Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: A General Equilibirum- Interest Group Perspective," Bulletins 7467, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    3. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2007. "Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 199-229, October.
    4. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?," IEW - Working Papers 166, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2007. "Contests with Multi‐tasking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(2), pages 303-319, June.
    6. John Boatright, 2009. "Rent Seeking in a Market with Morality: Solving a Puzzle About Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 88(4), pages 541-552, October.
    7. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    8. P. Van Cayseele, 2005. "Using Economics in Antitrust Decisions.Five Lessons from the European Scene," Review of Business and Economic Literature, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Review of Business and Economic Literature, vol. 0(5), pages 805-824.
    9. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2000. "Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 217-233, November.
    10. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    11. Jay Dow & James Endersby & Charles Menifield, 1998. "The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments, economic interests, and campaign contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 67-83, January.
    12. Richard Wagner, 1992. "Crafting social rules: Common law vs. statute law, once again," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 381-397, September.
    13. Gökhan Karahan & R. Coats & William Shughart, 2006. "Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 87-106, January.
    14. Kang, Jae Hyeong & Lee, Sanghack, 2001. "The social cost of entry contest in Cournot-Nash oligopoly," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 139-152.
    15. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, 2008. "Democratic Defences and (De-)Stabilisations," Springer Books, in: Matthew Braham & Frank Steffen (ed.), Power, Freedom, and Voting, chapter 11, pages 209-226, Springer.
    16. Geoffrey Brennan & Hartmut Kliemt, 2008. "Regulation and revenue," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 249-260, September.
    17. Robert W. McGee, 1998. "Some Ethical Issues in Trade Policy: Management Ethics versus the Law," International Trade 9805004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, "undated". "Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats," IEW - Working Papers 187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    19. Aidt, Toke S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2008. "Enduring rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 545-553, September.
    20. Long, Ngo Van & Stähler, Frank, 2009. "A contest model of liberalizing government procurements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 479-488, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:6:y:1987:i:3:p:851-868. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Emily Ekins (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/catoous.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.