This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Why Pay Child Benefits to Mothers?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Frances Woolley

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The "feminist" case for paying benefits to mothers is that women suffer if they have no independent access to economic resources. The "maternalist" case for targeting benefits rests on the idea that money paid to mothers is more likely to be spent in ways that benefit children. This paper evaluates both the feminist and the maternalist case using data on how households manage their finances. The paper argues that the feminist case is relevant in a minority of households; the maternalist case has most weight when the aim of child benefits is to meet children's basic needs, for example, for food and clothing.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economics.ca/cgi/jab?journal=cpp&view=v30n1/CPPv30n1p047.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: No access restriction except for the four most recent issues.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Toronto Press in its journal Canadian Public Policy.

Volume (Year): 30 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 47-69
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:30:y:2004:i:1:p:47-69

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Toronto Press Journals Division 5201 Dufferin Street Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3H 5T8
Email:
Web page: http://economics.ca/cpp/

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.utpjournals.com/cpp/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Haddad, Lawrence & Hoddinott, John & Alderman, Harold & DEC, 1994. "Intrahousehold resource allocation : an overview," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1255, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cathal O’Donoghue & Holly Sutherland, 1998. "Accounting for the Family: the Treatment of Marriage and Children in European Income Tax Systems," Innocenti Occasional Papers, Economic Policy Series iopeps98/25, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Working Papers 94-6, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  5. Zhiqi Chen & Frances Woolley, 1999. "A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making," Carleton Economic Papers 99-13, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Martin Dooley & Ellen Lipman & Jennifer Stewart, 2005. "Exploring the Good Mother Hypothesis: Do Child Outcomes Vary with the Mother's Share of Income?," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 31(2), pages 123-144, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Phipps, Shelley A & Burton, Peter S, 1998. "What's Mine Is Yours? The Influence of Male and Female Incomes on Patterns of Household Expenditure," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 599-613, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Browning, M. & Bourguignon, F. & Chiappori, P.A. & Lechene, V., 1992. "Incomes and Outcomes: A structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation," DELTA Working Papers 92-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kendra N. McLeish & Robert J. Oxoby, 2007. "Gender, Affect and Intertemporal Consistency: An Experimental Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 2663, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Frances Woolley & Shelley Phipps, 2006. "Control over Money and Wealth Accumulation in Canadian Families," Carleton Economic Papers 06-02, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Martin Dooley & Ellen Lipman & Jennifer Stewart, 2005. "Exploring the Good Mother Hypothesis: Do Child Outcomes Vary with the Mother's Share of Income?," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 31(2), pages 123-144, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.