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The Canada-European Union Turbot War: A Brief Game Theoretic Analysis

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  • Paul C. Missios
  • Charles Plourde

Abstract

This paper examines the conflict over catch quotas for turbot on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland between the European Union (EU) and Canada. Economic game theory is used to analyse Canadian policy, EU policy, and the ensuing resolution. Recommendations are provided for future agreements regarding the proper management of fish stocks to ensure the long-term viability of these resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul C. Missios & Charles Plourde, 1996. "The Canada-European Union Turbot War: A Brief Game Theoretic Analysis," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 22(2), pages 144-150, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:22:y:1996:i:2:p:144-150
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
    2. Gordon R. Munro, 1979. "The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(3), pages 355-376, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ben White, 2000. "A Review of the Economics of Biological Natural Resources," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 419-462, September.
    2. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 2001. "Leader and Follower: A Differential Game Model," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-08, CIRANO.
    3. Antje Wiener, 2016. "Contested Norms in Inter-National Encounters: The ‘Turbot War’ as a Prelude to Fairer Fisheries Governance," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(3), pages 20-36.
    4. Manuel P. Coelho & José B. Filipe & Manuel A. Ferreira, 2015. "Unregulated high seas fisheries: the “interlopers” issue," OBEGEF Working Papers 043, OBEGEF - Observatório de Economia e Gestão de Fraude;OBEGEF Working Papers on Fraud and Corruption.
    5. Elvin, S.S. & Taggart, C.T., 2008. "Right whales and vessels in Canadian waters," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 379-386, May.
    6. Janmaat, John A & Ruijs, Arjan, 2006. "Investing in Arms to Secure Water," MPRA Paper 10667, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. R. Quentin Grafton & Daniel E. Lane, 1998. "Canadian Fisheries Policy: Challenges and Choices," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(2), pages 133-147, June.
    8. Breton, Michèle & Keoula, Michel Yevenunye, 2014. "A great fish war model with asymmetric players," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-223.
    9. Missios, Paul & Plourde, Charles, 1997. "Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives," MPRA Paper 70748, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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