Economía política de los directivos de las empresas de economía social
AbstractIn the running of social firms, managers play a leading role which can guide the course of these companies. In this article we analyse the theoretical elements underlying the central importance of managers in social firms, the nature of these strategic human resources, particularly the variables which guide their behaviour, and their ability to take courses of action with can strengthen or corrupt the identity of social economy. Finally, from a prescriptive perspective we analyse the possibilities and limitations of the different types of director control and selection.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by CIRIEC-España in its journal CIRIEC-España, revista de economía pública, social y cooperativa.
Volume (Year): (2004)
Issue (Month): 48 (April)
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More information through EDIRC
Social economy; managers; corporate governance; managerial power; business paths.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
- L39 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Other
- M19 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Other
- P13 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Cooperative Enterprises
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
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