Influencia de la forma institucional y de los diferentes tipos de trabajo en el problema del control en las empresas de trabajo asociado
AbstractFrom a compared institutional analysis, the institutional characteristics and problems of agency are defined in different types of firms. There follows an examination of the interdependence and circularity of the problem of agency in labour managed firms, and the problems of control which occur in these businesses, with emphasis on the problem of control with regard to both managerial behaviour and operative work. One novel aspect of this work is the joint study of different hierarchical levels, dealing with the different types of work and the ease of, or difficulties in, mediation and evaluation as a basic substratum of the problem of agency, which in this article is added to the classic problems of agency in managerial behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by CIRIEC-España in its journal CIRIEC-España, revista de economía pública, social y cooperativa.
Volume (Year): (2004)
Issue (Month): 48 (April)
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Co-operatives; associated work; hierarchy; relation of agency; control; incentives; co-ordination; corporate governance.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M19 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Other
- P13 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Cooperative Enterprises
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- Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
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