Les externalités sociales permettent-elles de résoudre la controverse théorique des « petites coalitions stables » dans les accords environnementaux ?
AbstractA puzzle in the literature on the formation of coalitions supporting International Environmental Agreements (iea) is that if an iea leads to substantial gains, then it will not be supported by many countries. The non-cooperative game theoretic literature highlights the « small coalitions » puzzle by which only a small number of countries are willing to sign an environmental convention. In these models, a global coalition comprising all countries or most of the countries and generating significant global benefits is not sustainable. In effect, greater the number of countries in the coalition, higher the incentive of signatories to not respect their engagements. Introducing social externalities, we explain why in reality, some treaties can be sustained by nearly all the countries in the world, and others can be sustained by a handful of countries. Classification JEL : C72, H41, D74, Q00.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 57 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- Q00 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - General
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