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Liberalismus und Demokratie: Zu einer vernachlässigten Seite der liberalen Denktradition

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  • Vanberg Viktor J.

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  • Vanberg Viktor J., 2014. "Liberalismus und Demokratie: Zu einer vernachlässigten Seite der liberalen Denktradition," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 345-374, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:65:y:2014:i:1:p:345-374:n:17
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2014-0117
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Samet, Dov & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "Between liberalism and democracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 213-233, June.
    2. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325.
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