Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior
AbstractWe present a perfect Nash equilibrium in which the creator of a work, motivated by economic considerations, selectively enforces her own copyright. In fact, the creator may not only permit, but may strategically promote infringement of the copyright, thereby participating indirectly in predatory pricing, and so raising barriers to entry. Our model is highly applicable to the software industry, where relatively high entry costs and the relatively low cost of copyright infringement make this phenomenon likely. We further show the conditions under which exogenous intervention, through intensive enforcement of copyrights, increases social welfare. Finally, we explore some potential strategies for such legal intervention.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy.
Volume (Year): 3 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Minniti, Antonio & Vergari, Cecilia, 2010. "Turning Piracy into Profits: a Theoretical Investigation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 379-390, December.
- Eric Chiang & Djeto Assane, 2007. "Determinants of music copyright violations on the university campus," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 187-204, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.