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Does Seniority Matter? The Conditional Influence of State Methods of Judicial Retention

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  • Brent D. Boyea

Abstract

Objective. Capitalizing on attention directed to judicial agreement and the associated consequences of judicial elections, this article conducts an examination of the effects of seniority and state methods of judicial retention on decisions by state supreme court justices to dissent. Methods. Using data drawn from the State Supreme Court Data Archive, this research analyzes decisions by individual justices to dissent in 33,582 tort cases from 1995 to 1998. GEE logistic analysis with cases as the clustering unit is the estimation procedure. Results. While the seniority of justices is positively connected to dissent, the findings illustrate that seniority's effect is nuanced and conditioned by a state's method of judicial retention. The impact of a justice's seniority relative to his or her colleagues is most powerful in appointive courts where justices serve without fear of electoral retaliation. Alternatively, within elective courts, justices respond to elections by pursuing a consensual approach regardless of their seniority. Conclusion. The dissent characteristics of justices in state supreme courts are intricately tied to the length of careers and the methods by which states keep justices in office.

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  • Brent D. Boyea, 2010. "Does Seniority Matter? The Conditional Influence of State Methods of Judicial Retention," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(1), pages 209-227, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:91:y:2010:i:1:p:209-227
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00689.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth L. Manning & Bruce A. Carroll & Robert A. Carp, 2004. "Does Age Matter? Judicial Decision Making in Age Discrimination Cases," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-18, March.
    2. Hall, Melinda Gann, 2001. "State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(2), pages 315-330, June.
    3. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 1984. "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-56, January.
    4. Virginia A. Hettinger & Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, 2003. "Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 84(4), pages 792-810, December.
    5. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    6. Paul Rubin, 2005. "Public choice and tort reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 223-236, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alma Cohen & Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, 2015. "Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S1), pages 133-159.
    2. Felipe de Mendonça Lopes, 2019. "Dissent Aversion and Sequential Voting in the Brazilian Supreme Court," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 933-954, December.

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