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Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings

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  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars Ehlers

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.

Suggested Citation

  • Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers, 2020. "Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(3), pages 937-965, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:122:y:2020:i:3:p:937-965
    DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12362
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    Cited by:

    1. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Inácio Bó & Bertan Turhan, 2023. "Assignment maximization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 123-138, February.
    2. Francesco Campo & Sara Giunti & Mariapia Mendola & Giulia Tura, 2023. "Political Backlash to Refugee Settlement: Cultural and Economic Drivers," Working Papers 522, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
    3. Hagen, Martin, 2022. "Tradable immigration quotas revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    4. Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    5. Noda, Shunya, 2023. "A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 364-379.
    6. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Dur, 2023. "Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 321-338, April.
    7. Rohan Chowdhury, 2023. "A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 287-311, June.
    8. Miralles, Antonio & Pycia, Marek, 2021. "Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    9. Agnes Cseh & Klaus Heeger, 2020. "The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 2007, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    10. Anastasia Blouchoutzi & Dimitra Manou & Jason Papathanasiou, 2022. "The Regional Allocation of Asylum Seekers in Greece: A Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(10), pages 1-15, May.
    11. Dilek Sayedahmed, 2022. "Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 71-111, December.

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