Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government
AbstractThe authors study a simple model of tariff wars and trade deals in which government revenue collection and disbursement uses resources. The introduction of costly governments leads to lower non-cooperative tariffs, the possibility that a less costly government may win a tariff war, and fully cooperative trade deals where countries lower tariffs but do not eliminate them, even with lump-sum taxes and transfers. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576
Other versions of this item:
- John B. Burbidge & Gordon M. Myers, 2000. "Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-05, McMaster University.
- John B. Burbridge & Gordon M. Myers, 2000. "Tariff Wars and Trade Deals With Costly Government," Discussion Papers dp00-15, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised 08 Jun 2000.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- John B. Burbidge & James A. DePater & Gordon M. Myers & Abhijit Sengupta, 1996. "A Coalition-formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Block s," Department of Economics Working Papers 1996-05, McMaster University.
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