Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government
AbstractWe study a simple model of tariff wars and trade deals in which government revenue collection and disbursement uses resources. The introduction of costly governments leads to lower non–cooperative tariffs, the possibility that a less costly government may win a tariff war, and fully cooperative trade deals where countries lower tariffs but do not eliminate them, even with lump–sum taxes and transfers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by McMaster University in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2000-05.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: May 2000
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- John Burbidge & Gordon Myers, 2004. "Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 543-549, 08.
- John B. Burbridge & Gordon M. Myers, 2000. "Tariff Wars and Trade Deals With Costly Government," Discussion Papers dp00-15, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised 08 Jun 2000.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Protection For Sale,"
NBER Working Papers
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- John B. Burbidge & James A. DePater & Gordon M. Myers & Abhijit Sengupta, 1996.
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Department of Economics Working Papers
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- Kennan, John & Riezman, Raymond, 1988. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(1), pages 81-85, February.
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