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Unions' and Firms' Attitudes Towards Research Joint Ventures: When Will the Incentives Be Aligned?

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Author Info
Constantine Manasakis
Vasileios Zikos

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Abstract

This paper studies the relationship between unionization and innovation activity. Under a unionized labour market, we find that when R&D spillovers are relatively low (high), cooperative, as well as non-cooperative R&D is a strategic substitute (complement). Furthermore, irrespective of the spillover rate, cooperation increases firms' profits, whereas it increases union utility only if spillovers are sufficiently high. Alignment of incentives between firms and unions requires that firms pay transfers in the form of 'rent-sharing' to make a Research Joint Venture attractive to unions. Our results suggest that if spillovers are low enough, the amount of money that firms give up in order to buy unions' acquiescence weakens their incentives to form a Research Joint Venture. Copyright 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation 2007 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd..

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9914.2006.00362.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd in its journal LABOUR.

Volume (Year): 21 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 135-156
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Handle: RePEc:bla:labour:v:21:y:2007:i:1:p:135-156

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  1. Vasileios Zikos, 2007. "The Temporal Dimension of Wage Contracts in Oligopoly with Spillovers," Discussion Paper Series 2007_04, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
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